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ABSTRACT 
The European Single Market aims to promote trade and competition in electricity generation across the EU, with investment signals for new generation capacity and 
interconnection coming from zonal electricity prices reflecting scarcity value. However, a growing number of EU Member States have implemented national 
Capacity Mechanisms in order to ensure future security of supply within their own borders, which may distort the cross-border trade of energy. This local view of 
energy security is in response to internal technical and economic constraints and a perceived inability of cross-border electricity flows to be a reliable source of 
capacity at times of maximum stress, in favour of self-sufficiency. A number of routes are available to resolve this conflict through permitting cross-border 
participation of generators in local Capacity Mechanisms, but this requires resolution of a number of complicating factors, not least a means for properly allocating 
transmission capacity without introducing further distortions to the energy market. Alternative solutions could be enacted at an EU-level, such as through the 
alignment of Capacity Mechanisms to a common model, or the introduction of an EU-wide single Capacity Mechanism, but the current regulatory focus appears to 
remain on resolution of such issues at a national level. 
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1. Introduction 
The creation of a secure electricity system creates a distinct set of 
planning constraints for governments and their agencies. The overriding 
political goal is, primarily, to create ± through appropriate investment at 
sufficiently advanced timescales ± a market and network capable of 
serving the future demands for electricity (whatever that may turn out to 
be) across all sectors. As secondary concerns, this must also be done at 
reasonable cost to the end consumer and, in keeping with constraints on 
greenhouse gases and other atmospheric pollutants, be achieved within 
decreasing emissions limits.  These three objectives comprise what is 
FODVVLFDOO\ WHUPHGWKHµHQHUJ\WULOHPPD¶ (Ang, Choong, & Ng, 2015), to 
which may be added the requirement for the social impacts of electricity 
investment to be fairly allocated, and for associated commercial structures 
to enable investment to be secured in a manner compatible with standard 
financial instruments. 
(Jervis, 1978) presents the classical security dilemma of international 
politics: that many of the means by which a state tries to increase its 
security decrease the security of others. While the dilemma is originally 
posited in the context of Defence, the concept of the requirement for a 
collective security arrangement to be perceived as well-functioning by its 
member states (and even perhaps as a precondition to seeking membership 
of the arrangement) applies equally well to energy security. In the context 
of energy, states are highly interdependent; energy is vital to state 
survival, and can be used to harm other states leading to a complex 
intertwining of energy supply with geopolitics &LXWD 	 &LXWă . 
Within the European Union, there has been a growing move towards 
energy interdependence within a framework of Market Liberalism, based 
on cooperation through non-discriminatory open markets available to 
foreign investment HQDFWHG ZLWKLQ WKH µ6LQJOH 0DUNHW IRU (QHUJ\¶. 
However, each individual Member State must balance its degree of 
cooperation against its own sovereignty in energy (McGowan, 2008). 
As opposed to the general situation for energy, electricity is particular 
in that almost all countries possess the ability to be self-sufficient in terms 
of generation capacity, and to not be dependent on external imports 
(although conventional generation may be reliant on fuel imports). This 
means that each country broadly has the ability to determine its own 
electricity future according to its own technical and political situation, and 
to determine the extent to which it relies on cross-border trades in 
electricity to establish appropriate levels of electricity security. In recent 
years, the closure of conventional generators due to environmental 
regulations and the increasing penetration of renewable energy has led to 
increased concern over domestic levels of electricity security in Member 
States (RAP Energy Solutions, 2013). Additionally, many States have 
moved to support increasing localisation of energy systems in order to 
support diversity and security (Li, 2005). This has led many States to 
implement Capacity Mechanisms in addition to their core energy 
wholesale markets in order to ensure ongoing security of supply and fill 
an expected capacity gap. 
 In turn, the decisions of one Member State in how it treats electricity 
security will affect the extent to which its neighbours may be reliant on it 
for imports at key times of system stress. This leads to a situation where 
the Single Market may not yet be trusted by all Member States to provide 
mutual electricity security, leading to the implementation of national 
Capacity Mechanisms, which in turn reduces the effectiveness of the 
Single Market in ensuring security. This maps back to the central idea of 
WKH VHFXULW\ GLOHPPD ZKHUHE\ D 6WDWH¶V means of self-help - trying to 
escape from the dilemma by accumulating more and more local power - 
generates a cycle of power competition (Tang, 2009). 
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In this paper, we survey the evolution of cross-border trades in 
electricity in the EU; the current status of Capacity Mechanisms: where 
they have been implemented to date; the drivers for their implementation, 
and how this relates to the reality and perception of energy security; how 
Capacity Mechanisms have been incorporated into EU electricity 
regulation to date; the ongoing and future possible impacts on the efficient 
use of cross-border signals for generation investment; and, finally, how in 
the future these issues may be resolved at the European level. 
2. Development of EU Electricity Markets and Cross-
border Exchanges 
The reform and deregulation of western electricity markets through 
the 1980s and 90s included a restructuring of the generation sector to 
enable wholesale competition. Generation owners and operators would 
respond to price signals from centralised spot markets and/or bilateral 
trading with retailers, rather than investment in new generation being 
centrally planned and controlled.  
This shift from central planning, however, also removed the ability of 
governments to ensure through direct means that sufficient generation 
would be in place to meet demand. A market-based mechanism for 
HOHFWULFLW\ UHPRYHV WKH µFRPPDQG DQG FRQWURO¶ RI PRQRSRO\ JHQHUDWRUV
which can ensure adequate capacity margins. However, this centralised 
SODQQLQJFDQDOVR OHDG WR µJROGSODWLQJ¶RI VHFXUH VXSSOLHVE\ FUHDWLQJD
greater capacity margin than is necessary (Helm, 2004) . 
Under the market-led paradigm, spot markets for electricity should 
provide a complete price signal for sufficient investment in new 
generation capacity. If there is a perceived shortfall in capacity at some 
future horizon, it should also be evident to investors that there is a 
matched benefit in owning operating capacity at that point in time due to 
raised electricity prices reflecting that shortfall ± in other words, scarcity 
pricing should stimulate new investment. 
7KH µPLVVLQJ PRQH\¶ SUREOHP RFFXUV KRZHYHU ZKHQ FRQGLWLRQV
arise in markets which mean that the energy market alone does not 
provide sufficient (or sufficiently reliable) revenue for investment to 
occur. This may arise due to a number of factors, including (Newbery, 
2015): low wholesale energy prices (which may be driven by high 
penetrations of renewable generation with negligible marginal costs); 
price caps below the Value of Lost Load (the economic cost impact of not 
supplying a consumer with their desired power demand); inefficiently 
high transmission charging; or inadequate remuneration for ancillary 
VHUYLFHV6LPLODUO\WKHUHPD\EHWKHµPLVVLQJPDUNHW¶SUREOHPZKHUHWKH
revenue is in reality adequate but is not perceived to be so (Newbery, 
1989). 
Historically across Europe, transmission interconnections between 
national systems have been developed to promote security of supply, but 
increasingly have taken on a wider role in order to promote competition, 
trade and an increase in overall welfare across EU Member States 
(Jacottet, 2012). A shortage of interconnection capacity creates barriers to 
trade, and so the European Commission has been taking steps ± most 
significantly through the Third Energy Package of 2009 (European 
Parliament, 2009) ± to promote investment in new cross-border 
connections. The Energy Union package of 2015 refers to desirable levels 
of interconnection of 10% and 15% by 2020 and 2030 respectively, 
although there is no proposal for these targets to be mandatory (European 
Commission, 2015a). This underpins the European Internal Electricity 
Market (also known as the Single Market), which requires sufficient 
physical transmission links between member states to transmit demand, 
and enough efficient market-based mechanisms to make the most of the 
transmission capacity. In pursuit of this aim, the Commission has been 
promoting a Target Model for electricity markets to facilitate border-free 
trading across Europe. The Target Model is based on two broad 
principles: energy-only regional markets, preferably organised on a zonal 
EDVLV LQ ZKLFK JHQHUDWRUV¶ UHYHQXHV GHSHQG SULPDULO\ RQ WKH SULFH IRU
each marginal unit of energy supplied; and market coupling, which is a 
way of linking zonal day-ahead spot markets into a virtual market, so that 
the lowest priced bids are accepted up to the point where congestion 
constraints limit further trade (Keay, 2013). However, interconnector 
growth may be constrained by long lead times and capital investment 
costs in transmission infrastructure, as well as uncertainty on the part of 
investors that energy arbitrage will be sufficient in future to ensure long-
term profitability (Turvey, 2006).  
Figure 1 shows the increasing volumes of energy traded across 
Member State borders since the implementation of the Second Energy 
Package of 2003 which established the basic framework for market 
alignment (though it should be noted that not insignificant levels of 
energy have been traded across those borders for far longer through 
bilateral arrangements, and that the EU-wide framework has not been a 
pre-requisite for such trade). 
In some EU Member States, there have been Capacity Mechanisms 
established ± whereby electricity generators, interconnectors or demand-
side response providers receive some form of remuneration for being 
available to meet electricity demand irrespective of whether they actually 
are dispatched (either by the market or a central operator) to do so. These 
Mechanisms have been created in response to a perceived (or in some 
cases, actual) failure of the energy-only markets within those nations, and 
operating across borders between nations, to provide sufficient capacity to 
meet demand. The existence of these mechanisms may distort the wider 
price signals intended to underpin the European Single Market for 
electricity. 
3. Capacity Mechanisms in the EU 
A Capacity Mechanism may be defined as a measure taken by a state 
designed to support investment to fill an expected capacity gap and ensure 
Figure 1 - increasing volumes of cross-border trades in energy 
between EU Member States since the Second Energy Package of 2003 
(ENTSO-E, 2016) 
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security of supply. Typically, capacity mechanisms offer additional 
rewards to capacity providers, on top of income obtained by selling 
electricity on the market, in return for maintaining existing capacity or 
investing in new capacity needed to guarantee security of electricity 
supplies.  
Table 1 - Current EU Capacity Mechanisms (European Commission, 
2016; Hancher, de Hauteclocque, & Sadowska, 2015; Linklaters, 2014). 
Market Description Year Implemented 
Great Britain Centralised annual capacity 
auction 
2014 (as part of 
Electricity Market 
Reforms) 
Ireland Capacity payments for availability 2007 (as component of 
the all-island Single 
Electricity Market) 
Belgium Strategic reserve contracted by 
Transmission System Operator 
2014 
France Decentralised forward capacity 
obligation on Suppliers delivered 
through certificates 
2010 
Nordic Countries  
 
Strategic reserves procured 
through forward markets 
2003 
Germany Contracted re-dispatch reserve 
and winter reserve; a new 
Capacity Reserve mechanism has 
recently been approved 
2012, new reforms 
approved 2016 
Italy Temporary capacity payments; 
centralised auctions for reliability 
options are being developed for 
implementation from 2017/18 
2003 (following 
blackouts) 
Greece Capacity payments for availability 
at peak load times 
2006 (as part of wider 
market reforms 
following blackouts in 
2004) 
Spain  Fixed capacity payments for 
availability and new investment 
1997, reformed 2007 
Portugal Joined Spanish mechanism 2010, abolished 2013 
 
The European Commission recognises six forms of Capacity Mechanism 
within two broad categories (European Commission, 2015b): 
 
Targeted mechanisms, where support is given to additional capacity 
expected to be required on top of what is provided by the market: 
 
x  Tender: where a beneficiary of a tender receives public financing for 
the construction of a power plant; 
x  Reserve: where contracted capacity is held in reserve outside the 
market and only activated where necessary; 
x  Targeted capacity payment: where a price set by a central body is 
paid to a subset of capacity in the market (such as a specific 
technology type); 
 
 Market-wide mechanisms, where support is provided to all (or the 
majority of) providers of capacity in the market: 
 
x  Central buyer: where a volume of capacity required is set and a 
market determines the price at which this is provided through a central 
bidding process; 
x  De-central obligation: where an obligation is placed on market 
participants (such as retailers) to contract sufficient capacity to cover 
their demand; 
x  Capacity payment: A price for capacity expected to achieve sufficient 
investment is fixed, and the market responds with a variable volume. 
 
There are currently 13 EU Member States with some form of 
implemented capacity payments, summarised in Table 1. 
4. Drivers for Implementation of Capacity Mechanisms 
In the case of Italy and Greece, the occurrence of blackouts (in 2003 and 
2004 respectively) directly led to the implementation of capacity 
payments in order to bring new capacity rapidly to market and avert 
further such incidents. However, the remainder of national mechanisms 
are, instead, intended to avert future issues ± and are driven by perceived 
(rather than proven) failures in energy-only markets to be able to maintain 
a secure system in the future, according to the national-level assessment of 
the level of capacity that may require. The drivers may broadly be divided 
into economic, technical and political categories, although with some 
overlap between these classifications. Each are discussed in turn below 
with reference to exemplar market implementations, representing different 
designs as described in Section 3. 
4.1. Economic Drivers 
(FRQRPLF GULYHUV LQFOXGH WKH µPLVVLQJ PRQH\¶ SUREOHP GHVFULEHG LQ
Section 1 where energy market signals are themselves insufficient to 
either drive new investment capacity or to keep existing capacity 
operational; concerns over the market power held by individual actors 
where capacity margins are low; low profitability of (for example) gas 
generators; or issues in the coordination of generation and network 
investment ± for example, in Germany, there are major grid constraints 
between the North and South due to the growth of renewable energy, and 
as a result additional capacity is required in the South pending network 
reinforcement. 
For example, the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of Ireland, begun in 
2007, incorporated the previously separate markets of the Republic of 
Ireland (a sovereign nation) and Northern Ireland (a devolved region of 
the United Kingdom) into one centrally-cleared market, in order to 
maximize social welfare for the island of Ireland as a whole. 
Historically, there was concern over the constituent markets of Ireland 
being sensitive to plant entry and exit due to the size of the overall system, 
with a single gas generator being able to tip the market from shortfall to 
long-term surplus. As a result of the concerns that an energy-only market 
would not guarantee generation adequacy, the regulators made the call for 
an explicit Capacity Payment Mechanism (CPM) to be a requirement of 
the SEM:  
 
³:HDUHFRQFHUQHGDWWKHSRWHQWLDOYRODWLOLW\RIHQHUJ\PDUNHWSULFHV
and recognise that a key challenge for a generator who wishes to enter 
the market is to convince prospective lenders that the investment risk can 
be evaluated, and that the risk is reasRQDEO\ ORZ«WKH LQWHQWLRQ IRU D
CPM then, is for a mechanism providing for capacity adequacy through 
economic signals that are directly meaningful to investment decisions of 
4 ELECTRICITY SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
generators and to the decisions of demand side participants. These 
economic signals should lead to socially efficient decisions on new 
investments, on maintenance of existing capacity and on demand 
UHVSRQVH´(CER & NIAUR, 2005)  
 
The CPM was hence included in the SEM implementation, and 
designed to provide separate remuneration for capacity and so to limit 
volatility in energy prices, providing more stable signals for long-term 
investments in new capacity. Withdrawal of generation for maintenance is 
on a planned basis ± it is in the interests of owners of plant to plan to 
withdraw when the plant is least needed, so that their loss of capacity 
payments and any profit on the market is minimised. The CPM is 
composed of 3 payments from differing timescales, providing both stable 
long-term ex-ante signals and shorter term volatile ex-post cashflows. 
Similarly, in the Great Britain market, between 1990 and 2001, the  
µ3RRO¶ZDVWKHPHFKDQLVPLQSODFHIRUWKH*%HOHFWULFLW\PDUNHWDFWLQJDV
a compulsory day-ahead last-price market, and included a capacity 
payment based on loss of load probability. 
However, in the energy-only market introduced in GB under the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements of 2001, the expectation was that 
capacity adequacy would be maintained by electricity prices rising if the 
market anticipates an impending shortage of capacity ± WKH ³SHDN ORDG
SULFLQJ WKHRU\´ +RZHYHU LW KDV SURYHQ GLIILFXOW IRU JHQHUDWRUV WR EDVH
major capital investments on the basis of high prices in periods of supply 
scarcity due to operational (Linklaters, 2014), as well as the impact on 
market prices from increasing volumes of zero marginal cost renewable 
generation. There has hence been motivation to provide an additional 
revenue stream which may offset the failure to attract sufficient capital 
investment. 
4.2. Technical Drivers 
Technical drivers include reliability of ageing plant; increasing 
penetrations of near-zero marginal cost renewable generation; emissions 
caps restricting the operational lifetime of coal plant; and an inability to 
adequately predict future electricity demands. 
In the electricity market of Great Britain described above, the early 
attractiveness of gas generation and slow growth in electricity demand 
helped to maintain adequate capacity margins after liberalisation in 1989, 
but the last decade has seen the margin eroded and confidence in capacity 
adequacy has reduced for several reasons (Newbery & Grubb, 2014): 
 
x Age and environmental legislation (particularly the EU Large 
Combustion Plant Directive and Industrial Emissions Directive) 
leading to widespread retirement of coal plants; 
x Nuclear plants being retired at the end of their operational lifespans; 
x Rising and volatile gas prices deterring new gas plant; 
x A policy-driven uptake in renewable and intermittent low-carbon 
generation; 
x Uncertain trends in electricity demand. 
 
Figure 2 shows the reduction in capacity margin that has developed in 
recent years in the GB market, and the increase in wholesale price 
volatility that has occurred as a result due to scarcity pricing during 
periods of peak demand. As described, however, this pricing has failed to 
stimulate sufficient new investment in generation to prevent further 
reduction in security. 
In order to tackle both the adequacy issue and the economic issues 
described above the UK Energy Act 2013 set out a package of legislation 
for the Electricity Market Reform (EMR), which includes long-term 
Contracts for Difference for low-carbon generation, and a Capacity 
Market - the first such to be in place since the Pool was replaced (DECC, 
2016). The Capacity Market is an auction conducted annually for delivery 
RI FDSDFLW\ LQ  \HDUV¶ WLPH ZLWK DJUHHPHQWV ODVWLQJEHWZHHQ  DQG
years. While interconnectors have been permitted to access the market and 
bid in capacity, conservative de-rating factors have been applied to reflect 
the level of dependence on the pre-requisite market conditions for the 
external markets to support the GB system at times of key stress (Pöyry, 
2016). 
Under similar constraints, a Capacity Mechanism has been 
implemented in Belgium since the winter of 2014/15 in response to 
multiple threats to generation adequacy (Hoschle, 2015): 
 
x A planned phase-out of nuclear electricity begun in 2015; 
x Unplanned technical outages of ageing nuclear plants; 
x Mothballing of gas-fired generation units due to limited profitability. 
 
Elia, the Transmission System Operator (TSO), is responsible for  
FRQWUDFWLQJµ6WUDWHJLF5HVHUYHV¶IRUHDFKZLQWHUSHULRGIURPDPL[WXUHRI
generation and demand response, based on their own adequacy forecasts, 
with contracts extending from one to three years. Generating units which 
are intending to leave the market (either from being shut down or 
mothballed) are obliged to submit an offer. 
,Q*HUPDQ\WKHµ(QHUJLHZHQGH¶KDVOHGWRDSKDVH-out of nuclear and 
coal capacity in favour of renewable energy sources, with a growing cost 
of sourcing local flexibility and a constraint in terms of transmission 
capacity (Growitsch, Malischek, Nick, & Wetzel, 2013). A new tender-
based capacity reserve will be implemented from 2017 which will only be 
open to generators not already part of the power market, in order to 
stimulate new build (Linklaters, 2015). It should be noted, however, that 
WKLV LV LQ SDUDOOHO WR D WHPSRUDU\ µVHFXULW\ VWDQGE\¶ SD\PHQW WR exiting 
carbon-intensive lignite generators (Clean Energy Wire, 2016). This 
intervention essentially leads to a rearrangement of the dispatch order ± 
where lignite plant would previously have formed a significant component 
of dispatched generation, here additional payments are made to reserve 
the use of such units for stress events and so reduce overall carbon 
emissions. In this way, the consumer cost and environmental aspects of 
the Trilemma are directly linked. In the German market, such an 
arrangement is seen as transitional with the intention being that the core 
energy market should in the long-term provide sufficient signals for 
investment once the low-carbon transition has been achieved. This 
highlights that some Capacity Mechanisms may be seen as a permanent 
requirement of a secure energy market, while other States may consider 
the underlying drivers to be temporary issues to be resolved.  
4.3. Political Drivers 
Political drivers are more complex to assess. The appropriate level of 
security of supply within a market may be politically determined based on 
ZKDW LV SHUFHLYHG DV DQ µDFFHSWDEOH¶ OHYHO RI VHFXULW\ WKDW PD\ EH LQ
excess of the level economically determined by the Value of Lost Load. 
Secondly, volatility in power prices may be viewed as politically 
unsustainable ± even where that volatility is providing a price signal to 
generation investment. There is also an assymetrical nature to the issue of 
setting the level of desired security against an uncertain background. 
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A set of policies which leads to over-procurement of capacity results 
in a marginal iQFUHDVH LQ FRQVXPHU¶V HQHUJ\ ELOOV ZKHUHDV DQ XQGHU-
procurement of capacity may entail customer disconnections or even 
black-outs, which clearly result in far more significant political 
consequences. This is supported by the historical tendency of centrally 
planned markets to over-procure capacity. The Portuguese capacity 
market was abolished in 2013 following concerns about overcapacity 
(Clean Energy Wire, 2015) ± the additional cost placed on consumers was 
not seen as justifiable for the level of security gained. In this respect, 
separately from technical and economic considerations, as the costs of 
Capacity Mechanisms are borne by the end consumer, the conceptual side 
of electricity security ± WKHDELOLW\IRUDFRQVXPHUWRµWUXVW¶ the delivery of 
electricity when and how they require it ± must be sold to the non-
technical consumer at what is perceived to be a reasonable cost. 
Similarly, the technical narrative around a potential supply gap can 
also be subject to non-technical interpretation. In the GB market in 
September 2016, the System Operator, National Grid renamed their 
µ1RWLFH RI ,QVXIILFLHQW 0DUJLQ¶ ± a market notification system used to 
incentivise additional sources of capacity at key times ± WRD µ(OHFWULFLW\
Margin NRWLFH¶ (National Grid, 2016) in part in order to remove the 
implication that a failure of supply is likely to occur . 
Additionally, due to the amount of change being enacted in Western 
Electricity Markets, the need for a Capacity Mechanism may also be 
driven by the uncertainties of the policy environment ± one reason given 
for the recent downturn in capital investment in the GB market is the 
ongoing policy uncertainty that generators face (Linklaters, 2014), with 
recent governments publishing successive White Papers prioritising 
different aspects of the Trilemma and enacting market interventions 
driven by competing principles. 
Another dimension is the political desire, external to the electricity 
sector, as to whether to pursue further integration with neighbouring 
states. The UK, for example, held a referendum on EU Membership in 
June 2016 which led to a stated intention to cease membership of the 
Union. While it is not clear at the time of writing if this will lead to 
changes in the interaction of the GB and Northern Irish markets with the 
EU Single Market for energy, this wider economic stance appears to 
prioritise independence from mainland Europe over other concerns. 
In all of the economic and technical examples given in this section 
there is a political dimension to the Capacity Mechanism implementation, 
in that the Mechanism exists to facilitate a broader strategy in the supply 
of electricity ± be that the liberalisation of markets and the removal of 
central planning; a response to trends in the composition of generation 
sources (and a desire to hedge risk by having a diverse energy supply 
base); or in order to facilitate a growing penetration of inflexible and 
intermittent renewable energy sources which may negatively influence 
total system security. In this respect the enacting of a Capacity Market can 
Figure 2 ±  The influence of capacity on electricity prices in the GB system. The top graph shows the declining level of installed capacity 
(not including Contingency Balancing Reserve procured outside the market) for each winter period as identified by the System 
Operator against the predicted Average Cold Spell (ACS) Demand. The de-rated availability adjusts the capacity level according to the 
ability of each generation type to be able to contribute to meeting peak demand. The middle graph shows the capacity margin (i.e. the 
excess of generation capacity over peak demand) that is given from the above capacity levels once interconnector contributions are 
considered. The bottom trace shows the day-ahead energy price in the APX power exchange, showing the increasing volatility in 
wholesale prices as the capacity margin has decreased. (APX Power Spot Exchange, 2016; National Grid, 2016) 
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be seen as an interventionist tool which permits the government or its 
agencies to manually adjust their position on the Trilemma, as such a 
mechanism allows the rebalancing of cost versus security of supply while 
GLUHFWO\LQIOXHQFLQJDPDUNHW¶VFDSDFLW\IRU low carbon electricity sources. 
5. Impacts of Capacity Mechanisms on cross-border trade 
There are two types of cross-border distortions in markets resulting from 
local capacity mechanisms (Hancher et al., 2015). Firstly, static short-term 
distortions affect whether prices reflect the cost of production and hence 
whether the production of electricity is least-cost effective. If a capacity 
mechanism does not adequately consider non-domestic generation 
capacity, then wholesale distortions will arise. If a generator receives 
payments which affect their electricity generation bids into the market, 
and generators in a neighbouring energy-only market do not receive such 
payments, then this will alter the ability of generators in neighbouring 
markets to directly compete on price.   
Secondly, there may be dynamic distortions which impact generation 
investment decisions. Capacity mechanisms may even become the main 
driver for investments in new electricity generation capacity, rather than 
energy prices, as has been demonstrated in modelling of the potential 
impact of a capacity mechanism in the German market  (Ozdemir, De 
Joode, Koutstaal, & Van Hout, 2013). 
Other cross-border effects have also been identified  (Meyer & Gore, 
2015): 
 
x A decrease in peak prices, due to a solely energy-based remuneration 
being replaced with two-part payments to generators for energy and 
FDSDFLW\ PHDQLQJ WKDW WKH µPLVVLQJ PRQH\¶ SUREOHP ZKHUH PDUNHW
prices do not adequately represent scarcity value and so are 
insufficient to stimulate investment in new-build capacity) may be in 
part exported as generators in neighbouring markets cannot benefit 
from price spikes in the market with the Capacity Mechanism; 
x Impacts on capacity, due to additional investments being triggered in 
regions with a Capacity Mechanism at the possible expense of 
investment decisions in neighbouring markets; 
x Impacts on welfare, whereby an increase in generation capacity in a 
market with a Capacity Mechanism leads to a smaller increase in 
available capacity in a neighbouring market due to their 
interconnection, despite consumers in the second market not having to 
pay for that capacity; 
x A reduction in infrastructure investment due to reduced trade leading 
to lower congestion rents; 
x A redistribution of economic surpluses between generators and 
consumers (i.e. reduced or increased profit for investors) leading to a 
possible decrease in total welfare. 
 
Because a country has no control over generation at the other end of 
an interconnector there has been a default methodology which assumes 
that interconnectors do not make any contribution to national security of 
supply  (Newbery & Grubb, 2014).  
There are 3 main determinants of a shortfall of capacity in western 
European markets: the level of peak demand, failures of conventional 
plant, and the availability of intermittent generation. The chances that 
each of these could occur simultaneously in two or more neighbouring 
countries is hence low, and the role of interconnection is enhanced by the 
market coupling increasing responsiveness of flows to price differentials, 
so that imports should occur through cross-border signals in response to 
all but very short-term fluctuations. 
6. EU Regulation of Capacity Mechanisms 
The EU approach to capacity mechanisms has varied across legislative 
packages. In April 2015, in response to the growth in national capacity 
mechanisms, the European Commission launched a state aid inquiry into 
their use, in order to determine whether they ensure sufficient electricity 
supply without distorting competition and trade in the Single Market. 
6XFKPHFKDQLVPVDUHSHUPLWWHGZKHQ³WKHUH LVDUHDOULVNRI LQVXIficient 
HOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQFDSDFLW\´(European Commission, 2014)  in order to 
encourage new generation capacity, postpone closures of existing plant, or 
reward consumers for actions which lead to reductions in peak 
consumption. Design of such a mechanism, in addition to generic 
competition and market stipulations, is required to consider: 
 
x A clear demonstration of the reasons why the market cannot be 
expected to deliver adequate capacity in the absence of intervention; 
x A description of the unit of measure for quantification of security and 
its method of calculation; 
x Assessment of the impact of variable generation (including in 
neighbouring systems), demand-side participation, and 
interconnectors; 
x A remuneration only for availability: that is, a payment made per unit 
of power committed to be available, and not per unit of energy sold; 
x Adequate incentives to existing and future generators and allow for 
potentially different lead times for different technologies, and be open 
to potential aggregation of both demand and supply; 
x The ability for operators from other Member States to participate 
where it is physically possible for them to do so. 
 
Additionally, the mechanism should not reduce incentives to invest in 
interconnection capacity, undermine market coupling, strengthen market 
dominance, undermine pre-existing investment decisions or give 
preference to low-carbon generators with equivalent technical and 
economic parameters (that is, the mechanism should be distinct and 
separate from one designed to decrease the carbon intensity of 
generation). It should be noted that many extant mechanisms do not abide 
by the above requirements, and there is a distinction to be made between 
mechanisms which have developed to date in a relatively unregulated 
manner and those under consideration and implementation today. 
A sector enquiry by the European Commission found that two-thirds 
of such mechanisms are through targeted means, although mechanisms 
currently in planning tend towards market-driven designs (European 
Commission, 2016). Concerns have been raised that many technologies 
are often omitted from mechanism designs, and that only 3 markets 
(Belgium, Germany and Ireland) explicitly permit direct participation of 
cross-border capacity. It is also noted that µalmost half of the Member 
States studied appear not to have adequately established what should be 
their appropriate level of supply security before putting in place a capacity 
PHFKDQLVP¶ZKLFKPD\IXUWKHUGLVWRUW LQYHVWPHQWDVJHQHUDWRUVZLOOQRW
be capable of appropriately predicting future capacity procurement levels. 
Ongoing assessment of capacity mechanisms will be conducted on a case-
by-case basis by the European Commission, reflecting individual Member 
State requirements. 
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7. Routes to reconciliation 
The ongoing conflict between national/regional capacity mechanisms and 
the goals of a single European energy market may be addressed by a 
number of potential mechanisms, each of which carry a number of 
regulatory challenges: 
7.1. Incorporation of interconnection capacity into national 
mechanisms 
Firstly, the actual cross-border exchange of capacity could be permitted ± 
that is, generators in neighbouring markets are allowed to bid for capacity 
within the mechanism. This would ensure the competitive benefits of 
cross-border trading in energy are extended into capacity, and reduce 
overall costs. However, this would introduce several complexities ± a 
mechanism would be required to assess and certify foreign capacity and to 
determine its effective contribution taking into account transmission 
constraints, and to ensure that the foreign capacity is making the same 
effective provision as local participants. Further, the generation capacity 
would need to be matched by a firm transmission capacity across the 
interconnector. It would also be necessary to ensure that there were no 
other market distortions present between the markets. In the specific case 
of Great Britain, a carbon price floor contributes to wholesale prices being 
significantly higher than in continental Europe. Network charging, 
renewable subsidies and taxation of generation and supply would also 
need to be harmonised to prevent distortions. 
If a proportion of cross-border transmission capacity is reserved for 
this purpose, then this would limit the efficiency of cross-border energy 
trading. If the generator is instead required to purchase transmission rights 
to demonstrate an ability to deliver capacity, then while this would be 
more compatible with the EU target model for capacity allocation, this 
could lead to netted flows being inverted where both markets are capacity 
scarce and the provision of capacity is in opposition to the flow of traded 
energy. Similarly, the requirement to provide matched transmission 
capacity with generation capacity could be ignored under the assumption 
that cross-border flows are optimised, and prices should reflect scarcity, 
ensuring the flow is in the correct direction, but this may not occur under 
all conditions and would be dependent on Capacity Mechanisms between 
neighbouring countries being aligned. If capacity allocation is ignored, 
then there is no effective improvement upon the current methodology of 
taking into account the statistical contribution of interconnection rather 
than considering particular foreign generators ± indeed, under such a 
mechanism where the transmission capacity is determined by the price-
based flow, a foreign generator not participating in the Mechanism would 
be contributing to security of supply as much as one which was 
participating. 
In addition, if a generator is able to access neighbouring markets, then 
they may be able to simultaneously bid capacity into more than one 
market. This could prove problematic if that generator is called to deliver 
in more than one market simultaneously. This could be removed via 
appropriate regulation, or alternatively viewed as a risk by the market 
operator which can be ameliorated through the use of de-rated capacities, 
similar to the current treatment of interconnectors in the Great Britain 
Capacity Auction. Similarly, there is the question of whether transmission 
rights in the future purchased by a generator in one market entitles it to 
access the entire harmonised EU transmission system or only their 
domestic market ± should the market harmonisation extend to the point 
where interconnectors are treated equitably as elements of the 
transmission network rather than separate entities with separate access 
rights? 
 Expanding the terms of the auction to include cross-border 
participation would not, however, address the issue that differing 
incentives between markets could lead to an implicit competition of 
national Capacity Mechanisms among each other, which may shift the 
generation mix away from the optimum, if viewed at a pan-European level 
(Hoschle, 2015). Clearly, then, the value of interconnection needs to be 
recognised within a national capacity mechanism in order to avoid over-
procurement of local capacity at significant cost to the consumer, but the 
question remains of the optimal methodology for harmonising 
interconnection with a capacity mechanism to avoid distortions in cross-
border energy trading. Increasing transmission capacity under asymmetric 
market designs may even serve to magnify existing distortions (Cepeda & 
Finon, 2011).  
7.2. A single Capacity Market design 
A second approach would be to harmonise and coordinate national 
capacity mechanisms under a single design. However, with many different 
Capacity Mechanisms already in place, others being implemented, and a 
difference in generation backgrounds creating different drivers for design 
of those mechanisms, it seems unlikely that a single design would be 
appropriate across all Member States. The main drivers and objectives of 
&DSDFLW\ 0HFKDQLVPV YDU\ EHWZHHQ VWDWHV VR LW LV XQOLNHO\ WKDW D µRQH-
VL]HILWVDOO¶DSSURDFKZRXOd work. It does not appear that such a common 
design is a current focus of the EU Commission. Local market designs 
may also reflect local physical adequacy in a more efficient manner. 
7.3. A single EU-wide Capacity Market 
Taking this idea further, a single EU-wide capacity mechanism could be 
enacted, as capacity installed solely to cope with scarcity in each 
individual market area leads to overcapacity seen in the European context. 
In (Neuhoff et al., 2013), a nodal pricing market design across Europe is 
proposed (similar to that currently enacted within NordPool), where 
security is shifted away from regional operators (TSOs) towards 
centralised management. This approach appears to lead to an increase in 
transfers between countries due to more efficient use of interconnection 
capacity, but would obviously entail major institutional changes. 
However, systemic deviations away from the reference price at a node 
would provide a clear locational signal for power plant investment, in 
principle obviating the long-term need for separate capacity payments.  
The European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E) does not advocate a radical change in the 
governance framework for security of supply in Europe, but proposes that 
national markets integrate in a local manner (ENTSO-E, 2015). 
Eurelectric, the association representing the European electricity industry, 
has proposed a roadmap to a European capacity market in which the 
development of national Capacity Mechanisms, and their regional 
coordination, form the interim steps over the next decade (Eurelectric, 
2015). However, there remains a wider question over whether Capacity 
Mechanisms will endure as an appropriate means of tackling the growing 
question of security of supply against the aims of decarbonisation and, if 
the energy-only market is currently incapable of delivering adequate 
capacity, whether more fundamental redesign of European electricity 
markets ± capable of incorporating new sources of flexibility and 
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reliability ± may provide a more efficient solution (Gottstein & Skillings, 
2012). 
7.4. Alternative instruments 
An alternative view of the adequacy problem in modern-day electricity 
markets is that a perceived absence of capacity is not the core issue; 
rather, it is that flexibility of generation (such as by thermal plant ramping 
output to match a shortfall in renewable generation) is undervalued in 
modern markets, and may be further undervalued where Capacity 
Mechanisms are in use  (RAP Energy Solutions, 2012). In a Capacity 
Mechanism which is technology-neutral, qualifying generators are not 
incentivised to provide maximum flexibility. In this regard, alternative 
measures which directly remunerate flexibility on a technology-neutral 
basis are likely to be better suited to managing increasing levels of 
renewable generation in European markets. 
A second set of instruments which help to address the capacity issue 
are risk hedging products, which do not currently exist in all European 
markets (ENTSO-E, 2014), and may be traded across interconnectors in 
order to provide an additional signal for generation investment. This 
allows market participants to trade cross-border capacity and hedge 
against price fluctuations. This allows increased risk management by 
market participants, in turn incentivising increased trade volumes. 
8. Conclusion 
The implementation of Capacity Mechanisms in a number of EU Member 
States is threatening to distort the efficient flow-based price signals of the 
European Internal Electricity Market. The to-date regional view of 
electricity security prefers ongoing self-sufficiency over mutual security, 
even though this comes at a greater cost. However, as the drivers between 
countries for those Capacity Mechanisms are often similar, there is little 
perception that neighbouring European countries can or should rely on 
one another during periods of maximum system stress, which may be 
coincident across borders. It appears clear that scarcity pricing from 
energy-only markets will be insufficient to reassure national governments 
that their electricity system will remain secure in the long run. The 
trajectory towards decarbonisation in the EU will only continue to 
exacerbate this situation as the need for flexible sources of generation (to 
balance intermittent renewables) grows over time. 
It is not necessarily the case, however, that the choice between 
scarcity pricing and Capacity Mechanisms is a binary one, and that the 
latter must necessarily distort the former. If a Capacity Mechanism is 
based solely on availability rather than actual physical injections of 
electricity, then there is no effect on the spot market in terms of short-term 
dispatch. The effects are, instead, in the long-term, by affecting the 
generation mix, and this may be less significant than other national 
policies, such as through renewable generation incentives, carbon pricing 
or direct interventions into generation investment as a result of external 
government policies such as trade deals or wider economic planning. 
Similarly the Capacity Mechanism may be used as a policy instrument to 
enact a desired balance within the Energy Trilemma of security, 
environmental impacts, and costs to consumers. 
While each national Mechanism has been driven by a set of issues 
particular to that market, many of those issues are present ± or starting to 
develop - simultaneously in multple EU markets. An EU-wide approach is 
required which addresses these root causes in a manner that safeguards the 
efficient trade of electricity sought through the Third Energy Package, 
while providing sufficient signals to new investment in both generation 
and transmission. This may involve the use of Capacity Mechanisms as a 
stepping-stone towards risk sharing and hedging instruments that are 
active across borders, or it may continue to incorporate Capacity 
Mechanisms as a long-term solution, albeit with appropriate regulation in 
place to avoid distortions in cross-border trade. 
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